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ABSTRACT
Economic theory developed in the prior literature indicates that under the
joint and several liability imposed by the federal Superfund statute, the
government should recover more of its costs of cleaning up contaminated sites
than it would under nonjoint liability, and the amount recovered should
increase with the number of defendants and with the independence among
defendants in trial outcomes.  We test these predictions empirically using data
on outcomes in federal Superfund cases.  Theory also suggests that this
increase in the amount recovered may discourage the sale and redevelopment
of potentially contaminated sites (or “brownfields”).  We find the increase to
be substantial, which suggests that this implicit tax on sales may be an
important deterrent for parties contemplating brownfields redevelopment.
JEL references:  K32, K41, Q53, Q58, R38
Keywords:  Environmental law; Torts; Litigation and Settlement.
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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COST RECOVERY IN
SUPERFUND CASES:  IMPLICATIONS FOR
BROWNFIELDS AND JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
HOWARD F. CHANG and HILARY SIGMAN*
In the United States, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),1 also known as the Superfund
statute, makes certain specified parties potentially responsible for the costs of
cleaning up a contaminated site.  These potentially responsible parties (PRPs)
may include the current owners and operators of such a site, generators and
transporters of hazardous waste, and certain prior owners and operators of the
site.2  Courts have interpreted CERCLA to impose joint and several liability on
these PRPs for any indivisible harm caused by hazardous substances at the
site.3  Joint and several liability allows the government to recover the full costs
of cleanup at the site from any PRP, regardless of the PRP’s equitable share of
the liability.
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  4 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
  5 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(39)(A) (West Supp. 2005).
This liability regime allows the government to recover the full costs of
cleanup even if some of the PRPs are judgment-proof, because the other PRPs
remain liable for the full amount.  Advocates for joint and several liability
argue that shifting these costs from the government to PRPs improves the
incentives for those PRPs to avoid contamination of the property in question
(Segerson, 1994, p. 266).  Similarly, the breadth of the class of parties defined
to be PRPs increases the number of liable parties and thereby reduces the
probability that judgment-proof PRPs will limit the government’s ability to
recover its cleanup costs.
Joint and several liability under the Superfund law, however, has been
controversial.  Critics have advanced various proposals to limit the scope of
this liability (Kornhauser & Revesz, 1995, p. 115).  In a recent Superfund
case, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the scope of this liability by adopting a
relatively narrow view of both the circumstances justifying joint and several
liability and the parties subject to this liability.4
One influential objection to Superfund liability is the claim that the threat
of this liability deters the acquisition of potentially contaminated sites for
redevelopment.  This claim has stirred widespread concerns about
“brownfield” sites, which CERCLA defines as “real property, the expansion,
redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or
potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”5
Many communities seek to encourage the redevelopment of these
“brownfields” because these sites are considered not only sources of urban
blight but also substitutes for the introduction of new industrial sites in
suburban or rural locations, sometimes known as “greenfields.”  The use of
greenfields would reduce open space, contribute to suburban sprawl, and
require construction of new infrastructure.
A U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM) survey found 95,000 acres of
brownfields in 192 responding cities (USCM, 2003, p. 12).  The USCM
survey respondents listed “liability issues” as second only to “lack of clean up
funds” as an obstacle to the redevelopment of these sites (USCM, 2003, p. 14).
Similarly, a recent survey of private developers indicated that they consider
protection from liability for cleanup costs to be a valuable incentive to buy and
3
COST RECOVERY IN SUPERFUND CASES
  6 Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements with Prospective Purchasers
of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792
(1995).
  7 Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
  8 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(r) (West Supp. 2005).
to develop contaminated sites (Wernstedt et al., 2004, p. 17; Wernstedt, Meyer
& Alberini, 2006, p. 361).
Responding to the problem of brownfields, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), local communities, and developers have explored
various ways to encourage the redevelopment of these sites.  In 1995, the EPA
announced that it would issue more “comfort letters” to assure owners
engaged in cleanups that the EPA would not subject their properties to further
CERCLA actions (Percival et al., 2003, p. 269).  As part of its brownfields
initiative, the EPA also sought to expand the use of “prospective purchaser
agreements,” whereby a prospective purchaser and the EPA enter a binding
contract that includes a “covenant not to sue” the prospective purchaser under
CERCLA.6  In 2002, the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act7 amended the Superfund law to exempt a “bona fide
prospective purchaser” from liability as an “owner” under CERCLA as long as
the purchaser meets certain specified conditions.8
Moreover, each state has its own laws governing the cleanup of
contaminated sites in addition to the federal Superfund law.  Many state rules
mimic the CERCLA liability provisions, including joint and several liability
for owners and a broad set of other parties, but some states use different rules
(Environmental Law Institute, 2002, pp. 32-33; Geltman, 1996, pp. 4-5).  Most
states also have their own brownfields programs, which offer various
incentives for prospective purchasers and developers, including “comfort” or
“no further action” letters and covenants not to sue (Geltman, 1996, p. 9).
Similarly, joint and several liability is both common and controversial in
the environmental laws of other countries.  Most members of the European
Union and other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, for example, rely on joint and several environmental liability to
some extent but have also limited its scope (Clarke, 2001).  Thus, an analysis
of the effects of the federal Superfund regime in the United States provides not
only the basis for an evaluation of that regime but also some guidance for both
4
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states and other countries considering whether to adopt laws and policies
similar to those adopted by the U.S. government.
In Section I of this article, we survey results in the previous economic
literature regarding the effects of joint and several liability and the
implications of Superfund liability for brownfields.  In Section II, we describe
our data and our empirical test for the effects of joint and several liability
under Superfund on settlement amounts and awards at trial.  In Section III, we
present our results.  In Section IV, we discuss the implications of our results
for the brownfields problem.  In Section V, we conclude with some
observations regarding the policy implications of our results for the Superfund
liability regime.
I.  PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
First, we will review the predictions in the economic literature regarding
the effects of joint and several liability on the amount paid by defendants to
the plaintiff.  Second, we will review the literature on the brownfields
problem.  Some of the reasons for Superfund liability to discourage the
purchase of contaminated property arise from the tendency of joint and several
liability to increase the amount that the government can recover from PRPs
through litigation or settlement.  Most of these effects on brownfields arise
because the purchase may increase the number of defendants in a suit to
recover cleanup costs.
A.  The Effects of Joint and Several Liability
The economic theory developed in the prior literature suggest various
reasons to expect joint and several liability under the Superfund law to
increase the recovery of cleanup costs by the government.  First, this liability
regime allows the government to recover the full costs of cleanup even if some
of the PRPs are insolvent and thus judgment-proof (Segerson, 1994, p. 266).
Second, even if all PRPs are solvent, joint and several liability would increase
the government’s expected recovery from litigation as long as the outcomes at
trial are uncertain and not perfectly correlated across defendants (Kornhauser
& Revesz, 1995b, pp. 138-39).  This result emerges because the government
only needs to succeed against one defendant in order to recover all its cleanup
5
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  9 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2000).  Klerman (1996) refers to such a setoff rule as an
“unconditional” pro tanto setoff rule, because the court applies this setoff without inquiring
into whether the settling defendants were actually liable.
  10 CERCLA protects a settling PRP from contribution actions brought by other PRPs.  See
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2000).
costs under joint and several liability.  This effect increases in magnitude as
the correlation in trial outcomes among the defendants falls.
Third, as shown by Easterbrook, Landes, and Posner (1980, pp. 354-60),
even when outcomes at trial are uncertain and perfectly correlated across
defendants, joint and several liability may increase the amount that the
government can expect to recover through settlement compared to the
expected outcome of litigation against all defendants.  This result emerges
from joint and several liability under CERCLA’s “pro tanto” setoff rule, which
reduces the government’s claim against any nonsettling defendants by the
amount paid by a settling defendant in the settlement,9 because the gain for the
nonsettling defendants from this setoff tends to be too small to compensate for
the loss flowing from the absence of the settling defendant at trial, where that
defendant might share liability for any amount awarded by the court to the
plaintiff.10  This negative externality from settlement for nonsettling
defendants creates a race to settle with the government, which the government
can exploit to increase the total amount extracted from the defendants through
settlement.
Furthermore, the amount that the government can extract in such a
settlement increases as the number of defendants increases (Easterbrook,
Landes & Posner, 1980, p. 359).  The case of one defendant represents the
alternative of nonjoint liability insofar as joint and several liability can have no
effect in the case of one defendant.  Thus, an increase in the number of
defendants from one to greater than one triggers all the effects of joint and
several liability.  In this sense, an increase in the settlement amount as the
number of  defendants continues to rise further is a generalization of the effect
of joint and several liability.
In the absence of joint and several liability, we would observe none of
these effects on the amount recovered by the government.  In particular,
without joint and several liability, as long as judgment-proof defendants do not
constrain the amount recovered, we would not expect this amount to increase
with the number of defendants.  Instead, under these circumstances, the
number of defendants would have no effect on the expected recovery by the
6
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government, as each defendant would settle or pay a judgment for an amount
related to only its equitable share.
B.  The Brownfields Problem
Superfund liability may well inhibit the development of contaminated
property by discouraging buyers from purchasing these sites, but the reasons
for such an effect are more subtle than they might first appear.  After all, if the
liability rules merely forced the buyer to accept some share of a fixed expected
liability that they would otherwise impose on the seller, then they would not
deter a developer from buying the property as long as that transaction would
efficiently transfer the property to the party that would produce greater value
from the property.  The parties would simply adjust the price of the property
downward to reflect the transfer of liability from seller to buyer, and this
discount would ensure that economically efficient transactions go forward in
spite of this transfer of liability.  The previous economic literature, however,
identifies some possible reasons that a transfer of liability to a party buying
contaminated property may nevertheless discourage efficient transactions.
First, Segerson (1993) notes that if the buyer and the seller are not equally
likely to be judgment-proof, then a transfer of liability would distort incentives
to transfer the property from buyer to seller.  Liability would create too great
an incentive to transfer the property to prospective buyers that are more likely
to be judgment-proof than the current owner and too little incentive to transfer
the property to prospective buyers that are less likely to be judgment-proof
than the current owner.  Second, Boyd, Harrington, and Macauley (1996, p.
47) note that if the seller is better informed than the buyer about the
environmental condition of the property, then this information asymmetry can
create an adverse selection problem that drives high-quality property from the
market.  Third, they also note that even if the buyer and seller are equally well
informed, the government’s ability to detect contaminated sites is imperfect,
and current owners may keep property off the market to avoid attracting the
attention of regulators to contamination at the site (Boyd, Harrington &
Macauley, 1996, pp. 49-52).
Chang and Sigman (2007) identify additional reasons that Superfund
liability could discourage efficient transactions.  Superfund liability may have
these effects even if the buyer and seller are equally likely to be judgment-
proof and have the same information regarding contamination at the site and
even if the transaction has no effect on the probability of detection by
7
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  11 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2000).
  12 Solid Waste Disposal Act § 1004, 42 U.S.C.§ 6903(3) (2000); see CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(29) (2000) (incorporating the definition from the Solid Waste Disposal Act § 1004 into
CERCLA).
  13 See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, 966 F.2d 837, 844-46 (4th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940 (1992); Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863,
879-81 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002).  But see United States v. 150 Acres
of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2000); ABB Industrial Sys. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120
F.3d 351, 357-59 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 713-18 (3d
Cir. 1996) (same).
regulators.  All of the barriers to efficient transactions identified by Chang and
Sigman (2007) flow from the following feature of Superfund liability:  If a
PRP that owned the site “at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance”
sells the property, then under CERCLA, after such a sale, both the buyer and
the seller are PRPs.11  That is, the number of PRPs that the government can
hold jointly and severally liable increases upon such a sale if the buyer was not
already a PRP.  Furthermore, the law defines “disposal” broadly to include
“the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any
solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water.”12  Given this
broad definition of “disposal,” some courts have held prior owners liable even
if they engaged in no active disposal themselves if they owned the land while
wastes previously deposited on the land continued to leak or spill during their
ownership.13  The broader the definition of “disposal,” the more likely courts
are to hold prior owners liable as PRPs, and the more likely each sale of the
property is to increase the number of PRPs.
Chang and Sigman (2007) use a formal model of joint and several liability
developed earlier by Chang and Sigman (2000) to generate predictions of the
effects of Superfund liability. Chang and Sigman (2000) tested predictions
about the probability and speed of settlement in an empirical analysis of
Superfund cases but did not study the effects of this liability regime on the
amounts recovered by the government.  The same model also allows us to
study the effects of sales of contaminated property on the amount recovered by
the plaintiff, however, because this model allows us to vary the number of
PRPs at a contaminated site.  This model extended the models of joint and
several liability developed earlier by Kornhauser and Revesz (1994) and
Polinsky and Shavell (1981), which assumed only two defendants, and by
8
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  14 By bringing contribution actions against other PRPs, a defendant can ensure that they bear
an equitable share of response costs even if the government has not filed suit against those
other PRPs.  Under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, a defendant that has
paid more than a pro rata share of a joint and several liability has a right to contribution from
another defendant that has paid less.  Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 1(b)
(amended 1955), 12 U.L.A. 185, 194 (1996).  Under CERCLA, however, courts “may allocate
response costs among liable parties” when a private party seeks contribution from other PRPs
“using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”  42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)
(2000).
Easterbrook, Landes, and Posner (1980, pp. 356-60), which assumed perfect
correlation in outcomes at trial among all defendants and costless litigation.
Chang and Sigman (2007) predict that an increase in the number of PRPs
would have four distinct effects that would each discourage sales of
contaminated property.  First, if a sale of the property increases the number of
available defendants by adding the buyer as a new PRP, then the expected
liability of the buyer and the seller taken together increases insofar as the
addition of a new PRP tends to shift the allocation of expected liability away
from PRPs other than the buyer and the seller.14  Second, as long as the
outcome at trial for the buyer is not perfectly correlated with the outcome at
trial for any other PRP, then a sale would increase the amount of damages that
the government can expect to recover from the PRPs at trial and would
increase the expected liability of the buyer and the seller taken together.  This
effect is an extension of the effect noted by Kornhauser and Revesz (1995, pp.
138-39) in the case of only two defendants, insofar as the expected recovery of
the government under joint and several liability continues to increase as the
number of defendants increases.  Third, a sale would tend to increase the
collective litigation costs of the buyer and the seller taken together.  Fourth, a
sale may increase the amount that the government can expect to extract from
PRPs in a settlement.
The improvement in the government’s bargaining position in settlement
negotiations derives in part from the second and third effects noted by Chang
and Sigman (2007).  When a sale increases the amount that the government
can expect to recover at trial and the total litigation costs that a buyer and a
seller face as a group, each effect shifts the threat point in settlement
negotiations in favor of the government and against the buyer and seller of a
brownfield site.  If outcomes at trial are sufficiently correlated among
defendants, however, then settlement negotiations can add yet another reason
for the risk of Superfund liability to inhibit development of contaminated
9
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property:  an increase in the number of defendants may increase the
government’s ability to exploit the race among the defendants to settle, as
noted by Easterbrook, Landes, and Posner (1980).  Furthermore, a larger
number of defendants seems likely to reduce the defendants’ bargaining power
by making cooperation among them in settlement negotiations more difficult.
Thus, the second, third, and fourth effects distinguished by Chang and
Sigman (2007) would each imply that the government would recover a larger
amount as the number of PRPs increases.  Chang and Sigman (2007) predict
that the second and fourth effects would be most important when the number
of PRPs is small and that the amount recovered by the government would
increase at a diminishing rate as the number of PRPs grows, that is, recovery
should be concave in N, where N is the number of PRPs.  Empirical evidence
also confirms that litigation costs increase relative to cleanup costs as the
number of PRPs increases, holding other factors constant, and that this
increase also appears to be the most dramatic for sites with relatively few
PRPs (Acton & Dixon, 1992, pp. 51-52, 61; Dixon, 1995, pp. 176-77; Dixon,
Drezner & Hammitt, 1993, p. 37).  These data suggest that the second effect
identified by Chang and Sigman (2007) would also be most important when
the number of PRPs is small.
These comparative statics results are significant, given the small size of
most brownfields.  A recent study notes that these sites include a “large
number of abandoned gas stations and garages, former dry cleaning
establishments, small fabrication facilities, leaking underground storage tanks,
and other facilities,” and estimates that the size of the median brownfield site
is probably one acre or less (Wernstedt et al., 2004, p. 8).  For most of these
sites, an owner contemplating a sale would anticipate that there would be very
few other PRPs available as defendants in a potential lawsuit to recover
cleanup costs.
The first, third, and fourth effects distinguished by Chang and Sigman
(2007) are associated with the joint and several liability imposed by
Superfund, whereas the qualitative effects identified by Segerson (1993) and
Boyd, Harrington, and Macauley (1996) flow more generally from the transfer
of liability to new owners, whether or not this liability is joint.  Sigman (2009)
presents empirical evidence that joint and several liability in particular inhibits
the development of contaminated sites.  Those results suggest that joint and
several liability reduces land prices and increases vacancy rates in central
cities.  This evidence of the brownfields problem is consistent with the theory
presented by Chang and Sigman (2007).  The empirical analysis that follows
10
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  15 The difference between cost recoveries at sites with some disputes resolved at trial and
those at sites without any trial outcomes was not statistically significant.  Thus, we do not
distinguish amounts awarded at trial from those obtained through settlements in the analysis
that follows.
provides another opportunity to search for evidence of the brownfields
problem and to test for the predictions that emerge from economic theory.
II.  DATA
To explore these relationships empirically, we study federal cost recovery
actions for cleanup under the Superfund law.  Under CERCLA, the EPA may
seek to compel private parties to undertake cleanup or may fund cleanup from
the Superfund Trust Fund and then seek to recover cleanup costs from PRPs.
Although our model might apply to either funding approach, the empirical
analysis focuses specifically on cost recovery actions because the amount
obtained, relative to the amount sought by the government, is most easily
observed in this context.  Information on the dollar amount of settlements or
recoveries at trial can be combined with the EPA’s reported spending at the
site to produce a good measure of the share of costs recovered.  By contrast,
when the PRPs agree in a settlement to conduct a privately funded cleanup, no
public database records the amount that the government would have liked the
PRPs to spend.  Furthermore, whether this amount is high or low will depend
on characteristics of the site, and much of this heterogeneity among sites is
difficult to observe.
We assemble a data set on the value of cost recoveries obtained by the
federal government at Superfund sites, whether these amounts are won at trial
(about 2.5% of sites) or negotiated in settlements.15  This section describes the
sources of data and the resulting data set for our analysis.  We first discuss our
data for the dependent variable in our analysis, then we discuss our data for the
explanatory variables.
11
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A.  The Dependent Variable
Our basic data source on disputes is the EPA’s Integrated Compliance
Information System (ICIS), which contains records of civil, judicial, and
administrative federal EPA enforcement cases. Our data set contains
information on cases filed through April 2009. We restrict the data to cases
listing CERCLA as the relevant statute. 
The EPA provided us with an extract from its accounting database, the
Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) for CERCLA spending,
which allows us to estimate the ratio between total costs recovered at a site and
federal spending at the site.  Although the extract disaggregates spending for
different events, it does not have dates for these events, so our spending data
are undiscounted totals for nominal outlays rather than real present values.
These data were merged with the enforcement data (using some intermediate
EPA site codes).
 A small number of cases have recoveries that are several times the
reported expenditures.  We suspect that the administrative spending data,
especially the older data, may sometimes be incomplete, which would produce
some measurement error in our dependent variable.  This measurement error,
however, does not seem to be systematically related to our variables of
interest.  Furthermore, values greater than one may be valid, because the
recovery at a site may include overhead and interest, which we cannot
calculate because we do not know the timing of expenditures.  To exclude
those observations most likely to reflect measurement error, we restrict our
sample to sites with a cost recovery no greater than three times the costs,
which includes about 90% of sites in the data.  Our main results regarding the
effects of increasing N and other covariates are robust to more or less
restrictive caps on plausible cost recovery shares, although estimates for mean
recovery are sensitive to these caps.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the sites in our data set.  Our primary
data set only includes sites with at least one case in the enforcement data.  The
mean cost recovery at sites with cases was $1.98 million.  The mean cost to the
government was $5.51 million, but the distribution is skewed by a few sites
with very high costs.  The median cost was $851,000.  The mean site yielded
recovery of 56.1% of reported costs.
Table 1 also reports the data for a larger group of sites that have positive
reported government expenditure, but may not have any cases reported in the
enforcement data.  Sites may be absent from the enforcement data because the
12
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government has chosen not to pursue cost recovery or has not yet begun
formal proceedings to recover costs.  Some sites may be in this group as a
result of incomplete data:  the enforcement data seem to have significant
omissions, especially before the most recent decade.  We assume that recovery
at these “no case” sites is zero.  Because this assumption may not be valid for
some sites, we prefer the smaller data set for our analyses, but we report
results with the broader data as a sensitivity check.
B.  Explanatory Variables
Explanatory variables derive from a few data sets that we merged with the
cost recovery and administrative spending data.  One prediction from the prior
literature that we especially wish to test concerns the amount of cost recovery
as a function of the number of  PRPs.  Let N denote this number.  We have
two alternative measures of N.  One measure of N is a count of the number of
defendants at each Superfund site in the ICIS enforcement data.  Our second
measure of N comes from the Site Enforcement Tracking System (SETS),
which provides names and addresses of PRPs that have been sent notice
letters.  Each measure has its advantages and disadvantages.
The defendant counts may more accurately reflect the number of viable
defendants, for example, screening out judgment-proof PRPs sent notice
letters but not pursued.  This measure would be more relevant for testing the
predictions generated by the model in Chang and Sigman (2007), which arise
even if all PRPs are solvent.  Furthermore, the list of notice letters appears to
be incomplete as a list of PRPs, insofar as it fails to include all the defendants
listed in Superfund law suits.
On the other hand, the notice letter data generally represents a more
complete list of all potentially liable parties.  If the EPA recovers all its costs
from one group of PRPs, for example, then other PRPs may never appear as
defendants.  Yet we may want to include all those PRPs in our measure of N,
for example, if we want to include the effect generated by the model in
Segerson (1994), which requires at least some PRPs to be judgment-proof.
The PRP count data are  available for the broader group of sites that may have
had no reported case, and we report and use these data in that context.  The
correlation between the two measures of N is high (.57), however, so in
practice the regression results are qualitatively similar with either measure.
Table 1 reports that the mean number of defendants at a site was 17.6 and
the mean number of PRPs at a site was 26.7, but the distribution is very
13
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  16 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i), (B) (2000).
  17 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1995).  The EPA may conduct “removal”
operations to address “an  imminent and substantial danger to the public health” or “the
environment,” 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2000), but may conduct longer-term remediation
operations only at sites on the NPL (see id. § 9605; Percival et al., 2003, p. 224). 
skewed, and most sites had considerably fewer defendants and PRPs.  The
median number of defendants was 3, and the median number of PRPs was also
3 in the larger data set.  As the table reports, 29% of the sites in the data have
only one defendant or only one notified PRP.  These N=1 sites provide
examples of Superfund cases without any of the effects of joint and several
liability.
Another explanatory variable is the degree of correlation among defendants
in outcomes at trial, which the prior literature predicts would reduce the
expected cost recovery under joint and several liability.  As outcomes at trial
become more independent, theory predicts that the average cost recovery
should increase.  To measure the correlation in outcomes at trial, we focus on
PRP characteristics that may lead PRPs at a site to pursue different defense
strategies.  We expect sites with defendants pursuing diverse legal defenses to
exhibit less positive correlation among defendants in trial outcomes.
Our first measure of such diversity is whether the PRPs at the site include
off-site waste generators and transporters in addition to past and present
owners and operators of the site.  Off-site PRPs may raise legal defenses that
differ from those raised by on-site PRPs.  Whereas off-site PRPs may be more
likely to deny involvement with the site, for example, site owners may invoke
a defense for “innocent purchasers” of the site (Percival et al., 2003, p. 236), a
defense not available to waste generators or transporters.16  Uncertainty over a
court’s receptivity to each of these legal defenses may imply some positive
correlation in trial outcomes among PRPs invoking the same type of defense
and less correlation in trial outcomes among PRPs offering different defenses.
Thus, the presence of off-site PRPs at the site may reduce correlation among
defendants in trial outcomes.  
Data on whether sites have off-site contributors among their PRPs derive
from a 1993 survey of Remedial Project Managers (RPMs), the officials in
charge of overseeing cleanup at each site on the National Priorities List
(NPL).17  The RPM data set pertains only to sites that were on the NPL in
1993, whereas our other data sources include sites that are not on the NPL but
addressed by federal removal actions and sites added to the NPL since 1993.
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  18 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
Thus, only a subset of the sites in the main data set are in the RPM data, and
sample sizes for equations containing variables from the RPM data are much
smaller.
Our second variable expected to affect the correlation among defendants in
trial outcomes is whether some contamination occurred at the site after 1980.
Virtually all NPL sites had some contamination prior to 1980, the year that
Congress passed the Superfund law, but only some of these sites had
additional contamination after 1980 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
1995).  If the same PRPs contributed to both the earlier contamination and the
later contamination, then we would not expect contamination in both periods
to affect the correlation among defendants in trial outcomes.  If different
defendants contributed contamination at different times, however, then the
difference in timing may cause defendants to offer different legal defenses.
In particular, because the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)18 imposed requirements for “cradle to grave” tracking of hazardous
waste in the late 1970s, the sources of contamination are probably better
documented in the later period than the early period.  A defendant associated
with earlier contamination would therefore be more likely to deny contributing
waste to the site, raising a defense likely to turn on evidence specific to that
individual defendant.  A defendant associated with later contamination may be
more likely to raise legal defenses less dependent on defendant-specific factual
findings.  These defenses may be more likely to turn on legal issues raised by
other defendants.  The more important these common legal defenses become,
the greater the correlation among defendants in trial outcomes may become.  If
so, contamination from the later period may increase the correlation among
defendants in trial outcomes.
It is also possible, however, for more recent contamination to reduce this
correlation.  Trial outcomes for defendants that deny contributing waste to the
site may be correlated insofar as there may be uncertainty regarding how
receptive the court would be to such claims in general.  Trial outcomes for
defendants raising other legal defenses may be independent if each defendant
would raise a different and unrelated defense.  In any event, we include this
control variable to capture the net effect of contamination after 1980 on cost
recovery, whether this effect proves to be negative or positive on balance.
Furthermore, because litigation costs may affect settlement negotiations,
we would also like measures of the variation in these costs for the plaintiff and
15
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  19 Eisenberg and Farber (1997) argue that market discipline will force firms to indulge either
taste less freely than other litigants.
the defendants.  Because the plaintiff is the same in all federal Superfund
cases, measures of variation in the plaintiff's costs are not obvious.
Heterogeneity across defendants, however, may correlate with defendants’
litigation costs.  We consider two different defendant characteristics that we
can derive from the list of defendants’ names.  We include both as control
variables to see how robust our results are with respect to the effect of N.
First, we coded defendants as either firms or other types of defendants.
Non-firm defendants include individuals and their estates, local governments,
federal agencies, and nonprofit organizations, including universities.  Firms
may have systematically higher or lower litigation costs because they are the
least likely to indulge tastes regarding legal disputes, either for or against
litigation.19  Furthermore, if firms tend to have deeper pockets than individuals
or other non-firm defendants, then the presence of firms as defendants may
increase cost recovery because firms are less likely to be judgment-proof.
Second, we identified defendants at each site that were also defendants at
other sites.  Table 1 reports that on average 25.9% of defendants at a site were
also defendants for at least one other site, suggesting that these repeat players
are very important in practice.  The number of sites at which a defendant is a
PRP may have several possible effects on settlement negotiations.
On the one hand, these defendants may reduce settlement amounts for two
reasons.  Defendants who are PRPs at multiple sites may develop more
expertise and enjoy some economies of scale, tending to decrease their
litigation costs and to improve their bargaining power in settlement
negotiations.  In addition, these defendants may have the incentive to establish
reputations for driving a hard bargain, reducing their aversion to litigation and
thus also tending to produce lower settlement offers.
On the other hand, PRPs that are present at multiple sites may increase
settlement offers if such PRPs face higher costs in terms of public relations
when they appear to thwart cleanup at a site.  These PRPs may also agree to
higher settlement amounts because the government can threaten retaliation
against them at other sites if they are uncooperative.  Furthermore, defendants
with more litigation experience may have a more realistic sense of their
chances of success, making it less likely that an optimistic bias will induce
lower settlement offers.  Finally, because these defendants tend to be larger
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entities, they may also have deeper pockets than other defendants and
therefore yield greater cost recovery.
In general, we would also expect litigation costs to have a smaller effect on
the share of cleanup costs recovered by the government as cleanup becomes
more costly in absolute terms.  Empirical evidence suggests that litigation
costs are likely to be larger relative to cleanup costs for sites where remedies
are less costly.  Data collected by RAND show that at sites with relatively low
cleanup costs, litigation costs accounted for a larger share of expenditures than
at those with higher cleanup costs, other factors held constant (Dixon, 1995, p.
177; Dixon, Drezner & Hammitt, 1993, p. 37).  Thus, for example, insofar as
litigation costs confer an advantage to the government in settlement
negotiations, this advantage would have a less important effect on the share of
cleanup costs recovered as those cleanup costs grow larger in absolute terms.
This effect might lead one to expect the share recovered to decrease as cleanup
costs increase.
Furthermore, PRPs may be less likely to be able to pay the full costs of
cleanup as those costs grow larger, which may also lead us to expect the share
recovered to fall as those costs rise.  On the other hand, if the government’s
threat to sue becomes more credible as the amount at stake increases relative to
litigation costs, then we might expect the share recovered to increase as
cleanup costs increase.  To capture all of these possible effects, we include the
absolute cost of cleanup by the federal government as a control variable.
Finally, holding the government’s bargaining power constant, we might
also expect the share of government cleanup costs recovered to vary inversely
with the need to get PRPs to fund additional cleanup.  The government might
face a tradeoff between recovering its own cleanup costs from the PRPs and
extracting other concessions in the form of privately funded cleanup. We use
two alternative measures of direct PRP expenditures to control for this
heterogeneity among sites.
First, the ICIS enforcement data includes the cost to defendants of privately
funded cleanup mandated by the government.  The quality of these data,
however, seems poor.  In particular, the share of cases with positive costs
reported is considerably smaller than the share of sites known to have privately
funded cleanups.  We suspect that the data set often reports zero cost when the
true value is unknown or not specified in the settlement.  Furthermore, like the
share of government cleanup costs recovered, the cost of mandated private
cleanup is likely to be an endogenous function of the bargaining power of the
government, which makes this variable less than ideal as an explanatory
variable.  Nevertheless, we consider it useful to include this cost as a control
17
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  20 The dependent variable is zero for many observations, so we might use a  censored model
such as a Tobit.  Estimates using a Tobit yielded similar estimates for marginal effects as the
linear models presented here, but a test of conditional means rejects the Tobit specification.
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) coefficients provide a reasonable estimate of the marginal
effects of interest (those for the realized recoveries, including observations where the recovery
equals zero) without making the restrictive assumptions required for the Tobit (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005, p. 542).
variable simply to test whether our results are robust for the explanatory
variables of primary interest.
Second, the 1993 RPM survey asked site managers to estimate past and
future PRP expenditures at their sites. The managers chose one of ten possible
ranges to represent the total amount at each site.  We use the mid-point of each
range to construct a single summary variable for estimated PRP expenditures.
For example, the median response for estimated PRP expenditures was in the
range of $10 million to $15 million in our data set.  As indicated in Table 1,
we use the mid-point value, $12.5 million, as the cost for the median site.
III.  RESULTS
Table 2 contains our most basic comparison between nonjoint and joint
liability, comparing sites with N=1 to sites with higher numbers of defendants
or PRPs.  As Table 2 reports, sites with one defendant have an average
recovery of 32%, whereas those with more than one have an average recovery
more than twice as large, 66%.  Similarly, if we examine all sites (with  “no
case” sites treated as having zero recovery) and use the number of PRPs for N,
the average recovery is 17.4% for single PRP sites and 37.9% for multi-PRP
sites.  For each definition of N, a t-test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the
sites subject to joint liability and those subject to nonjoint liability have the
same mean for the share of costs recovered.
Table 3 explores the relationship between cost recovery and N in more
detail, examining in particular the hypothesis that cost recovery is concave in
N.  Column (1) defines N as the number of defendants, whereas column (2)
defines N as the number of PRPs sent notice letters.  In each case, we run a
linear regression20 using a different dummy variable for each size class with
N>1.  We define the classes finely for small N, despite some loss of precision
in the estimated coefficients due to small cell sizes, because the brownfields
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  21 The estimator considered the powers -2, -1, -.5, .5, 1, 2, 3, and the log of defendant count
and found that the powers .5 and 1 of defendant count yielded the best fit.  The estimated
coefficients (and standard errors) were 1.065 (.182) and -.295 (.089) on these powers of
defendant count, respectively.  The estimated increase in share recovered when the number
of defendants increases from one to two is 14.6 percentage points.
problem makes us especially interested in the effects observed at sites with
small N.
The results in Table 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that cost recovery
is concave in N, with either of our two definitions of N.  In column (1), the
government recovers a share of costs at sites with two defendants that is 10.6
percentage points greater in expectation than the share of costs recovered at
single-defendant sites. Recovery at sites with three to four defendants is 19.5
percentage points greater than recovery at single-defendant sites, and the
estimated function becomes much flatter thereafter.  The effects are similar
when we use the PRP notice letters in column (2).  The increase in the number
of PRPs from one to two yields an increase of 7.4 percentage points in cost
recovery, with little difference in the increase for three to four defendants.
The function is flatter for PRP notices than for defendants, presumably
because some of the recipients of notice letters are judgment-proof.
Figure 1 shows estimates of a flexible functional form for the relationship
between the share recovered and the number of defendants. The figure is the
predicted value and confidence interval for a regression of share recovered on
two powers of defendant count, where the estimation procedure has selected
the powers that yield the best fit.21  We restrict the data set to sites with fewer
than 50 defendants, so the estimates are not unduly influenced by the small
number of sites that have vast numbers of defendants and are not the focus of
our interest.  The flexible functional form is consistent with many different
shapes, but the estimated shape appears to be concave over the region of
interest.  The results are also consistent with a monotonically increasing
function of the number of defendants.  The confidence interval widens as the
number of defendants increases, probably because the number of observations
tends to fall as we move toward sites with larger number of defendants.
In Table 4, we examine the effects of the other determinants of cost
recovery amounts.  These specifications also allow us to examine whether our
results for N are robust when we control for these other factors.  Table 4
reports our results using the number of defendants as our measure of N.  The
inclusion of other factors in columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) does not change our
results regarding the effect of N on cost recovery.  Cost recovery still increases
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in N, and the function becomes flatter as N grows larger, as predicted by the
prior literature.  If anything, the estimated effect of N at sites with small
numbers of defendants is even greater once we control for other factors.
Column (1) includes the characteristics of the defendants, specifically the
fraction of defendants at the site that are firms and the fraction of defendants at
the site that are also defendants at multiple sites.  Increasing the fraction that
are repeat defendants has a statistically significant positive effect on the share
of cost recovered.  These repeat defendants may agree to higher settlement
amounts, for example, because they have higher effective litigation costs, less
biased perceptions of their prospects for success, or deeper pockets.  The share
of defendants that are firms also has a significant positive effect on cost
recovery.  This coefficient may reflect either higher effective litigation costs or
deeper pockets for firms than for other defendants.
Column (2) in Table 4 adds the federal government’s cost of cleanup as
another explanatory variable.  This cost has a statistically significant negative
effect on the share of costs recovered.  Larger cleanup costs may be associated
with lower recovery because litigation costs become relatively less important
as a source of bargaining power for the government.  This result may also
emerge because the PRPs are less likely to be able to pay the full costs of
cleanup as those costs become larger.  Finally, the negative correlation
between this explanatory variable and the dependent variable may simply
reflect errors in the measurement of the federal government’s cost of cleanup.
In any event, all the coefficients maintain the statistical significance that they
exhibit in column (1) when we add this new explanatory variable in column
(2), and each coefficient increases in absolute value as we go from column (1)
to column (2).
Column (3) in Table 4 adds the cost of privately funded cleanup mandated
by the government as a control variable.  This cost has a statistically negative
effect on the share of costs recovered.  Thus, once we control for the sources
of bargaining power reflected in the other explanatory variables, the
government does seem to recover less of its own cleanup costs when it extracts
greater concessions in the form of privately funded cleanup.  Most important,
all of our other coefficients in column (3) maintain the statistical significance
that they displayed in column (2), and all but one maintains or increases its
absolute value.
Column (4) in Table 4 adds explanatory variables from the survey of
Remedial Program Managers to the analysis in column (2):  we introduce a
dummy variable for the presence of an off-site PRP, a dummy variable for
contamination at the site since 1980, and a variable for the estimated cost of
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  22 Analyses that used a set of dummy variables for the estimated expenditure ranges (instead
of a single continuous variable) produced very similar coefficient estimates for the other
variables in our equations.  We report results for the continuous variable for ease of
interpretation.  A substantial number of the survey responses are missing.  To keep the data
for these sites in our analysis, we include a dummy variable to indicate these missing survey
responses and set the continuous variable equal to zero at those sites.  The missing value
dummy is not statistically different from zero in the estimated equation. 
PRP expenditures at the site.  We expect the first two of these added variables
to affect the correlation among defendants in trial outcomes.  Although the
inclusion of these explanatory variables reduces the number of observations,
all but one of the coefficients repeated from columns (1) and (2) remain
significant at the 5% level in column (4).  The other coefficient remains
significant at the 10% level and increases in absolute value.  Thus, our primary
results prove to be quite robust when we control for several other important
sources of heterogeneity among sites.
We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the dummy
variable for the presence of off-site defendants.  Because we control for the
number of defendants, we interpret the presence of off-site PRPs as suggesting
a lower correlation among defendants in trial outcomes.  The result here is thus
consistent with the prediction that such a reduced correlation would increase
the amount of cost recovered by the government under joint and several
liability.
The coefficient for the dummy variable for recent contamination, the
second factor we expect to affect the correlation among defendants in trial
outcomes, has a negative point estimate.  This sign is consistent with the
hypothesis that defendants contributing contamination since 1980 are more
likely to raise legal defenses that imply greater correlation in trial outcomes
than defendants contributing less recent contamination.  This result, however,
is not statistically significant.
The coefficient on site manager’s estimate of PRP expenditures at the site
is negative and statistically significant.22 This result appears to confirm the
evidence of substitution between direct expenditures by PRPs and cost
recovery observed in column (3).  The estimated effect, however, is small:
increasing PRP direct expenditures by one standard deviation ($28.4 million)
reduces the share of costs recovered by the government by only 6 percentage
points (or $300,000 at mean government costs).
Finally, column (5) in Table 4 restricts the data to sites that the site
managers report have no off-site PRPs.  We impose this restriction because the
21
COST RECOVERY IN SUPERFUND CASES
  23 The coefficients on the size classes of N do rise dramatically at the upper end of the range,
but this area (N>100) is less relevant for most brownfields.  Furthermore, the data quality is
suspect in this range. It seems implausible that sites with only owner and operator PRPs would
have a very large number of PRPs.  Most such sites have only a small number of PRPs. 
effect of an increase in the number of owners or operators at a site is especially
relevant for the brownfields problem.  The brownfields problem predicted by
Chang and Sigman (2007) arises when a sale or lease of a contaminated site
brings in a new owner or operator and thus adds another PRP to the site.  The
specification in column (5) allows us to test whether the effects of N reported
in Table 3 continue to hold in this special case.  The results in column (5)
suggest that those results do indeed emerge in this more restricted data set.
Cost recovery seems to maintain about the same relationship with N (for
N<100) as in Table 3, although the coefficient estimates are less precise
perhaps because of the much smaller number of observations.23  Thus, the data
for owners and operators seem to be consistent with the effects of N predicted
by Chang and Sigman (2007).
IV.  DISCUSSION
Our results indicate that increasing the number of PRPs or defendants
greatly increases the expected liability of PRPs at Superfund sites.  Column (1)
in Table 3, for example, suggests that increasing the number of defendants
from one to two raises the government’s expected recovery from 32% of its
costs to 43%.  The magnitude of this implicit tax on sales or lease transactions
suggests a substantial deterrent for an owner contemplating either a sale to a
new owner or a lease to a new operator.  In either case, this implicit tax may
discourage an efficient transaction and thus generate a brownfields problem.
Our results are all the more striking given that they seem likely to understate
the deterrent effect of the number of PRPs on the sale or lease of most
brownfields for several reasons.
First, our data include only the recovery of costs incurred by the
government.  A larger number of defendants may also improve the
government’s ability to extract concessions from the defendants in settlement
negotiations in the form of privately funded cleanup.  The available data on
the cost of privately funded cleanups indicate it also increases as the number
of defendants or PRPs at a site increases in our sample; this cost is also
positively correlated with the amount recovered from defendants for
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  24 This cost is positively correlated with both the number of defendants and the number of
PRPs (correlation coefficients of .08 and .07, respectively) and with cost recovery (correlation
coefficients of .11 overall or .36 if we condition on positive values for both cost recovery and
private cleanup costs).
  25 To be more precise, neither the number of defendants nor the number of PRPs has a
statistically significant effect on the ratio between cost recovery and the sum of the cost of
mandated private cleanup and cost recovery.
government cleanup.24  Thus, the evidence is consistent with the hypotheses
that the government’s ability to extract costly concessions increases with the
number of defendants or PRPs and that the government uses its bargaining
power both to recover more of its own cleanup costs and to require the
defendants to spend more on privately funded cleanups.  Furthermore, there is
no evidence that the government shifts from extracting one type of concession
to extracting the other as the number of defendants or PRPs increases,25 which
suggests that our results would also apply to the cost of privately funded
cleanup as a function of the number of defendants or PRPs.  The costs of
privately funded cleanup could deter the sale of brownfields, just as greater
expected liability for publicly funded cleanup would.
Second, sale of a site could shift expected liability from other defendants to
the buyer and the seller of the site.  Third, a larger number of defendants may
also increase the litigation costs that the defendants bear, either by litigating to
judgment at trial or prior to negotiating a settlement.  These litigation costs are
quite large relative to cleanup costs.  A 1994 RAND study of Superfund sites
estimated that such costs accounted for 32 percent of private-sector PRP
expenditures through 1991, with cleanup costs accounting for the other 68
percent (Dixon, 1995, pp. 179, 183).  That is, these litigation costs were equal
to nearly half of the cost of cleanup itself.  Either transfers to other defendants
or increased litigation costs could deter sales, just as increased recovery by the
government of its cleanup costs could.
Furthermore, we suspect that the federal cases in our sample involve
especially large cleanup costs, and empirical evidence suggests that litigation
costs are even larger relative to cleanup costs at sites with lower cleanup costs,
holding other factors constant (Dixon, 1995, p. 177; Dixon, Drezner &
Hammitt, 1993, p. 37).  The median brownfield site is small and likely to have
cleanup costs that are low compared to the sites studied by RAND, even if
these costs are large compared to the value of the property.  These facts
suggest that the share of expenditures that owners expect to devote to litigation
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costs at most brownfields are even higher than suggested by the RAND
estimates, which were based on sites on the National Priorities List, and higher
than those at sites appearing in our sample of federal cases.  Thus, the impact
of the litigation costs added by the sale of a site is likely to be greater at most
brownfield sites than at the sites in our sample.
Thus, litigation costs in our sample are likely to have a relatively small
effect on the share of cleanup costs recovered by the government, compared to
the typical brownfields site.  We find evidence that as cleanup costs grow
larger, the government recovers a smaller share of these costs.  This result is
consistent with the hypothesis that litigation costs are a source of bargaining
power for the government that is most important when the cost of cleanup is
relatively small, which is likely to be especially true of the typical brownfields
site.
Finally, the threat of liability is most likely to deter sales precisely when
that threat imposes the greatest cost.  If potential PRPs avoid transactions that
would connect them with those particular sites, then we will be unable to
observe the large increases in the government’s recovery that would occur if
the number of PRPs at those sites were to increase.  This selection effect will
tend to leave only sites with relatively small costs caused by increases in the
number of PRPs in our sample, which will cause our results to underestimate
the effect of a sale of the average site.
On the other hand, there is also a selection effect that may tend to produce
a bias in the opposite direction.  If potential PRPs avoid transactions that
would connect them with sites that feature judgment-proof PRPs, because any
new PRP would bear a larger share of any expected liability at those sites, then
these sites may be more likely to have few PRPs.  Insofar as the presence of
judgment-proof PRPs would also tend to reduce the government’s recovery of
its cleanup costs, this selection effect would tend to imply lower recovery at
sites with few PRPs, which might lead us to overestimate the effect of an
increase in the number of PRPs on the government’s recovery at the average
site.
Our results, however, suggest that this selection effect has relatively little
impact on our estimates.  If our estimates were an artifact of the presence of
judgment-proof PRPs at some sites, then one would expect the effect that we
observe to become smaller or to vanish when we remove those PRPs from our
measure of N.  Thus, if the government tends to pursue solvent PRPs rather
than judgment-proof PRPs as defendants, then any upward bias in our
estimates caused by judgment-proof PRPs would fall as we move from the
number of PRPs to the number of defendants as our explanatory variable.  If
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we compare the two columns in Table 3, however, we see that our coefficients
get larger rather than smaller as we move from column (2) to column (1).
These results suggest that judgment-proof PRPs are not so concentrated at
sites with few PRPs as to produce a substantial upward bias in our estimates.
Furthermore, when we add explanatory variables expected to be correlated
with deep pockets or the judgment proof problem in columns (1) and (2) of
Table 4, our results for the effect of N remain virtually unchanged.  If
judgment-proof PRPs caused an important upward bias in our estimates, we
would expect these estimates to fall when we add these explanatory variables.
If anything, however, these estimates seem to increase as we add these control
variables rather than decrease.
We infer that any effect of judgment-proof PRPs as a source of upward
bias in our estimates is probably modest.  On balance, we believe that our
results are more likely to understate the deterrent effect of increases in N at the
average brownfields site than to overstate that effect.  We are especially
confident in this belief when we rely on the number of defendants rather than
the number of PRPs as our explanatory variable, because our results using the
number of defendants should be less subject to the effects of judgment-proof
PRPs.
V.  CONCLUSION
Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions that emerge from
theoretical models of joint and several liability in the existing literature.  We
find that the share of cleanup costs recovered by the government is increasing
but concave in either the number of defendants or the number of PRPs, as the
models predict.  We also find some evidence that sites with defendants with
less correlated outcomes at trial may yield greater recovery of cleanup costs
for the government.
Of particular policy interest, we find strong evidence that increasing the
number of defendants also increases the recovery of the government’s cleanup
costs.  Chang and Sigman (2007) suggest that such an effect may arise from
joint and several liability and this implicit tax on transactions that add another
PRP to the site may discourage sales of sites with known or suspected
contamination, thereby contributing to the brownfields problem.  Although the
results may thus indicate a disadvantage of joint and several liability, it is
possible that some portion of the effect that we detect would persist even in the
absence of joint and several liability.  After all, a larger number of defendants
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would imply that the insolvency of any defendant is less likely to limit the
government’s recovery of cleanup costs, even under nonjoint liability, because
the share of cleanup costs paid by each defendant is less likely to exhaust that
defendant’s available assets.
Whether or not the source of the effect is joint and several liability, the
magnitude of the increase in cost recovery suggests a substantial implicit tax
on brownfields transactions and thus lends support to efforts to keep sales of
contaminated sites from increasing the number of parties subject to Superfund
liability.  These efforts include, for example, actions by the EPA, Congress,
and the states to protect purchasers from Superfund liability.  If a buyer knows
for certain that it would not be treated as a PRP, for example, then the
deterrent effect that we identify would be absent.  Thus, by reducing or
eliminating the probability that a purchaser would be liable, these policies
avoid or mitigate the deleterious effects that the threat of Superfund liability
can have on the incentives to buy contaminated property.  Our results also
suggest that the buyer has a better case for relief from liability when the
number of PRPs at the site is small.
The effects that relate to brownfields, however, are only a few of the many
effects to weigh in a more comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of
these various policy alternatives.  There are many other reasons militating in
favor or against these policies.  For example, a broader scope for joint and
several liability may affect incentives for the parties to settle out of court,
thereby avoiding costly litigation (Kornhauser & Takeda, 2007; Chang &
Sigman, 2000; Kornhauser & Revesz, 1994).
Moreover, by increasing the government’s recovery of cleanup costs, joint
and several liability may have complex effects on the ex ante incentives of
private parties to avoid environmental contamination (Tietenberg, 1989).  On
the one hand, expanding the class of parties from which the government can
recover full damages may promote the internalization of negative externalities
in the presence of judgment-proof PRPs, which in turn would improve the
incentives to reduce contamination (Segerson, 1994, pp. 266-68).  On the other
hand, Kornhauser and Revesz (1995, pp. 123-28) identify some circumstances
in which joint and several liability could instead reduce incentives to avoid
contamination.
Others have suggested that insofar as the increase in the government’s
recovery derives from the ability of the government to exploit a “race to settle”
among the defendants, rather than from a reduction in the impact of
insolvency, settlements under joint and several liability may lead to greater
deterrence than trial outcomes would, which may create too great an incentive
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to avoid contamination (Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, 1980, p. 359; Spier,
1994, pp. 562-63).  On the other hand, this effect may offset the general
tendency for strict liability to deter too little in the context of joint causation of
harm, where each tortfeasor bears only a share of the harm it causes at the
margin (Kornhauser & Revesz, 1995, pp. 120-21).  A comprehensive
normative analysis of all these issues is well beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, our empirical analysis contributes to a more complete picture of
the effects of Superfund liability, both on the share of cleanup costs recovered
by the government and on the incentives for private parties to sell or lease
contaminated property.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard Median Number
Deviation of values
Conditional on a case being reported
Government costs recovered (million dollars) 1.98 7.61 .128 1522
Share with recovery=0 .346 – – 1522
Government costs (million dollars) 5.51 18.7 .851 1522
Share of government costs recovered .561 .752 .147 1522
Defendant count 17.6 60.3 3 1522
Share sole defendant .291 – – 1522
Offsite PRP present .541 – – 686
Contamination since 1980 .544 – – 634
Cost of mandated private cleanup (million dollars) 6.31 37.5 0 1522
Firm share of defendants .684 .350 .8 1522
Multi-site defendant share .259 .327 .111 1522
Estimated PRP expenditures (million dollars) 23.2 28.4 12.5 503
Not conditional on a case
Government costs recovered (million dollars) 1.20 6.04 0 2477
Share with recovery=0 .635 – – 2477
Government costs (million dollars) 4.18 15.8 .510 2477
Share of costs recovered .319 .631 0 2477
PRP count 26.7 97.5 3 2477
Share sole PRP .292 – – 2477
Notes: Standard deviation and median for continuous variables only. “Not conditional on a case”
includes sites with costs, but no case reported in the enforcement data set. Cost recovery set equal
to zero for sites without a case.
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Table 2: Comparison of share of costs recovered under joint and non-joint liability
N = 1 N > 1
N =Defendants
Mean share of costs recovered .320 .660
Standard error of mean (.030) (.024)
Observations 443 1079
N = Notified PRPs
Mean share of costs recovered .174 .379
Standard error of mean (.018) (.016)
Observations 724 1753
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Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares estimates: Effects of N with different definitions
Dependent variable: Cost recovery/costs
N =Defendants N =PRP notices
(1) (2)
Size classes of N:
2 .106∗ .0739∗
(.053) (.0347)
3 or 4 .195∗∗ .0759∗
(.055) (.0333)
5 to 9 .337∗∗ .182∗∗
(.058) (.0391)
10 to 99 .597∗∗ .368∗∗
(.056) (.0399)
100 or more .661∗∗ .503∗∗
(.097) (.0667)
Constant .320∗∗ .174∗∗
(.030) (.0185)
Observations 1522 2477
R-squared .092 .061
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%
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Table 4: OLS estimates: Other determinants of settlement amounts
Dependent variable: Cost recovery/costs
No offsite
PRPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size classes of defendant count:
2 .118∗ .121∗ .123∗ .143† .146
(.052) (.052) (.051) (.086) (.100)
3 or 4 .216∗∗ .229∗∗ .229∗∗ .337∗∗ .248∗
(.054) (.054) (.054) (.091) (.115)
5 to 9 .349∗∗ .380∗∗ .381∗∗ .302∗∗ .315∗∗
(.058) (.058) (.058) (.086) (.119)
10 to 99 .581∗∗ .627∗∗ .633∗∗ .579∗∗ .361∗∗
(.055) (.056) (.056) (.081) (.139)
100 or more .670∗∗ .711∗∗ .721∗∗ .606∗∗ .760∗∗
(.096) (.097) (.098) (.126) (.284)
Multisite defendant share .307∗∗ .308∗∗ .314∗∗ .359∗∗ –
(.059) (.059) (.059) (.086)
Firm defendant share .112∗ .115∗ .109∗ .201∗∗ –
(.046) (.046) (.046) (.075)
Costs (million $) – -.0055∗∗ -.0055∗∗ -.0048∗∗ –
(.0007) (.0007) (.0008)
Cost of private cleanup – – -.00075∗∗ – –
(million $) (.00025)
Offsite PRP present – – – .136∗ –
(.062)
Contamination since 1980 – – – -.0424 –
(.0571)
Estimated PRP expenditures – – – -.00213∗ –
(.00093)
Constant .160∗∗ .170∗∗ .174∗∗ .088 .280∗∗
(.040) (.040) (.040) (.088) (.056)
Observations 1522 1522 1522 634 315
R-squared .116 .134 .135 .174 .051
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
†significant at 10%; ∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%
Column (4) also contains a dummy variable for missing PRP expenditure data.
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Figure 1: Predicted share recovered (fractional polynomial regression)
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